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NOTES

seem to be compelling arguments for the schedules' existence. And it certainly
should be noted that the practice of law and professions in general are not
proper spheres for competition based on competitive pricing and that the bar
association minimum fee schedules assist the public as well as attorneys, particularly young practitioners, in determining the reasonable value of particular
services.
Minimum fee schedules in a profession which has heretofore not been placed
within the prohibitions of the Sherman Act deserve a considered evaluation
under the rule of reason, if for no other justification than that the legal profession has long been considered exempt. Therefore, suddenly to apply the
Sherman Act to the profession would result in the same adverse effects avoided
by the Supreme Court in continuing baseball's exempt status. The court in
Goldfarb appeared far more zealous in condemning the legal profession's use
of the fee schedules than it did in finding support for its decision. Whether a
fee schedule promulgated by a state bar association is exempt from the Sherman
Act under the Parkerv. Brown73 analysis is not entirely clear from the Goldfarb
case. This would certainly be resolved by litigation in a state having a fee
schedule issued by a state bar association empowered by the supreme court
of that state to regulate the practice of law.
Robert R. Veach, Jr.

Illinois v. Somerville: An Encroachment on the
Double Jeopardy Protection
The defendant, Donald Somerville, was indicted by an Illinois grand jury
for theft. After the jury was impaneled and sworn, and before any evidence
had been presented, the prosecutor realized that the indictment was fatally
defective under Illinois law since it failed to allege that the defendant intended to deprive the owner of his property permanently. The combined
operation of Illinois rules of procedure and substantive law rendered this
defect jurisdictional,' forming a non-waivable basis for a successful appeal of
any verdict rendered at the trial level. Faced with this procedural impasse,
the trial court concluded that further proceedings under the faulty indictment
would be a waste of time and granted the state's motion for a mistrial, over
the defendant's objection. Subsequently, the grand jury returned a second
indictment which did allege the requisite intent. After the defendant's claim
of double jeopardy was rejected, a second trial proceeded to a verdict of
71 See

note 46 supra, and accompanying text.

'ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 16-1(d) (1) (1963) provides that an intent to deprive the
owner of his property permanently is a necessary element of the crime of theft, and omission
of this element renders an indictment insufficient to charge any crime. Another Illinois
statute provides that only defects in form, not substantive defects such as this one, may be
cured by amendment. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 111-5 (1964). ILL. CONST. art. I, S 7
provides that an indictment is the sole method by which a criminal prosecution may be
commenced.
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guilty, which was upheld on appeal.! The defendant's application for a federal
writ of habeas corpus was denied by the district court, and the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed.! The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari and remanded the case for reconsideration,4 whereupon the
Seventh Circuit held that habeas corpus relief had been improperly denied
since jeopardy had attached when the jury was impaneled and sworn, and
that a declaration of a mistrial, over the defendant's objection, precluded a
retrial under the valid indictment.5 The state appealed to the United States
Supreme Court. Held, reversed: Under the circumstances of this case, the
declaration of a mistrial was required by "manifest necessity" and the "ends
of public justice," and, therefore, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth
amendment, as made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment,
did not bar the defendant's retriaL Illinois v. Somerville, 93 S. Ct. 1066, 35
L. Ed. 2d 425 (1973).
I.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY:

A

FUNDAMENTAL PREMISE

The fifth amendment protection against double jeopardy is, and has been,
consistently recognized as a basic and necessary tenet of our legal and constitutional system.' There has been a plethora of litigation attempting to
establish the point at which jeopardy attaches, the courts continually seeking
to ascertain whether or not the defendant actually and legally will be put
in jeopardy of life or limb by a second criminal trial, and attempting to draw
the line accordingly. Although the situations are diverse,' the general rule,
gleaned from the more recent cases, appears to be that jeopardy attaches when
the jury is impaneled and sworn.!
288 111.App. 2d 212, 232 N.E.2d 115 (1967). The defendant's petition for leave to
appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court was denied. 37 Il. 2d 627 (1967).
'429 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1970).
4401 U.S. 1007 (1971).
5447 F.2d 733 (7th Cir. 1971) (applying United States v. John, 400 U.S. 470 (1971)).
6Orfield, Double Jeopardy in Federal Criminal Cases, 3 CALIF. WESTERN L. REV. 76
(1967). See also United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1294 (No. 15204) (C.C.D.
Mass. 1834). See id. at 1294-1303 for extensive discussion of the history of the double
jeopardy doctrine. It has been said that there is "no principle of the common law, grounded
upon the great rock of the Magna Charta, more firmly rooted than that no man shall be twice
vexed with prosecutions for the same offense." Ex parte Ulrich, 42 F. 587, 590 (W.D. Mo.
1890). See also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392 (1958). For a discussion of the antecedents of double jeopardy protection, see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 150-55 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting). Prohibitions against a second trial for the same offense are found
in the United States Constitution and in the constitutions of all but five states: Connecticut,
Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Vermont; however, in all of these states the
protection is recognized at common law. See ALl, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL
LAw 61-72 (1935).
'See, e.g., United States v. Shoemaker, 27 F. Cas. 1067, 1069 (No. 16279) (C.C.D.
Il1. 1840) (no jeopardy attaches if the defendant is tried on a void indictment); United
States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 212 (No. 15321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (jeopardy cannot
attach until the entire criminal proceeding has been completed). See generally Note, Double
Jeopardy: The Reprosecution Problems, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1272 (1964); Note, Criminal
Law-Double Jeopardy, 24 MINN. L. REV. 522-24 (1940); Annot., 6 L. Ed. 2d 1510
(1962). For a discussion of the doctrine as it relates to practice in Texas, see Steele, The
Doctrine of Multiple Prosecutions in Texas, 22 Sw. L.J. 567 (1968).
'See, e.g., Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963); United States v. Van Vliet,
23 F. 35 (E.D. Mich. 1885). See also Huey v. State, 88 Tex. Crim. 377, 227 S.W. 186
(1920) (defendant was not in jeopardy when convicted by a jury which was not sworn
as required by law). But see Roberts v. State, 72 Miss. 728, 18 So. 481 (1895).
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However, jeopardy may be prevented from attaching at the stage of the
prosecution at which it would normally do so for a wide variety of reasons,
including defective pleadings by the prosecuting authorities,' misconduct of a
United States attorney and a mistrial on the defendant's motion," granting
of a mistrial on the court's own motion without the defendant's consent, 1 and
the jury's inability to reach a verdict." The doctrine of "manifest necessity""
was developed by the courts as a legal concept to prevent the acquittal of a
defendant on a plea of double jeopardy where a mistrial had been granted
for certain of the reasons stated. The concept has been employed where the
courts felt that a mistrial was declared as the only way to protect the "ends
of public justice."'" Application of the doctrine has traditionally been limited
to two general fact situations: those cases where a mistrial was necessitated
by extraordinary and unforeseeable circumstances," and those cases in which
the jury has been unable, after sufficient deliberation," to reach agreement
on a verdict.' Although some courts have gone so far as to state that the8
jury may be discharged in any case where the "ends of justice" require,'
without such discharge operating to bar another trial, the general weight of
authority requires that the circumstances be compelling and beyond the control
of court and attorney."
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) (indictment failed to charge murder due to
failure to allege time or place of death); Simpson v. United States, 229 F. 940 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 241 U.S. 668 (1916) (defective indictment).
"'Minker v. United States, 85 F.2d 425. 427 (3d Cit. 1936) (improper and prejudicial
opening statement); Blair v. White, 24 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1928) (improper reference to
a prior conviction). See also Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924, 932 (9th Cir.

1949).

"1Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364 (1961), aff'g 282 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1943), discussed in The Supreme Court, 1961 Term, 76 HARV. L. REV. 104, 106 (1962); Comment,
Conditions Barring Plea of Double Jeopardy After Mistrial, 36 N.Y.U.L. REv. 730 (1961).
See also Annot., 6 L. Ed. 2d 1510 (1962).
12Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892)
(hung jury as to two of the four defendants, the double jeopardy plea of the first two was upheld when they were joined with
the remaining defendants for a second trial); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
579 (1824). For further examples of situations in which jeopardy has been held not to
attach, see United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971) (judge anticipated improper line of
questioning by prosecutor and aborted trial); Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949)
(tactical necessity of the military); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (outside
influence brought to bear on juror).
"The manifest necessity rubric appears to have originated from an 1815 pronouncement
by Justice Story that a trial court has the power to discharge the jury whenever it is necessary to serve the purpose of justice. United States v. Coolidge, 25 F. Cas. 622 (No. 14858)
(C.C.D.
Mass. 1815).
4
See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
5
See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (letter published in newspaper rendered juror's impartiality doubtful); United States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207
(No. 15321) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (insanity of juror); United States v. Bigelow, 14 D.C.
(3 Mackey) 393, 401 (1884) (the death or incapacity of the trial judge); State v. Malouf,
199 Tenn. 496, 287 S.W.2d 79 (1956) (death of juror); Woodward v. State, 42 Tex.
Crim. 188, 58 S.W. 135 (1900) (serious illness in juror's family); Annot., 53 A.L.R.
1057 (1928).
'" The court may abuse its discretion by ordering the discharge of the jury after too brief
a period
of deliberation. Grigsby v. State, 158 Tex. Crim. 484, 257 S.W.2d 110 (1953).
17
See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892)
(jury deadlocked for 40
hours); United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). COLO. CONST., art. II, S
18, expressly provides that a defendant shall not be deemtd to have been placed in jeopardy
if the8 jury is unable to agree on a verdict.
See Thompson v. United States, 155 U.S. 271, 274 (1894); People v. Simos, 345
Ill. 226, 178 N.E. 188 (1931).
' See Himmelfarb v. United States, 175 F.2d 924 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
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II. MANIFEST NECESSITY: A TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVE

The earliest "manifest necessity" case, United States v. Perez,' involved a
situation where the jury was unable, after lengthy deliberation, to reach a
verdict. In that case the United States Supreme Court held that "in all cases
of this nature, the law has invested courts of justice with the authority to
discharge a jury from giving any verdict, whenever, in their opinion, taking
all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the
act.... " Thus, the doctrine was initially formulated to cope with a narrow
situation completely beyond the control of either the court or counsel."2 The
narrow strictures set out by the Court in Perez were noted and observed in
Wade v. Hunter,' where the tactical necessities of a rapidly advancing wartime army required that a court-martial be aborted, transferred, and reconvened under a different authority. In denying the defendant's plea of former
jeopardy, the Court in Wade was careful to point out that it was the exigencies of the situation, giving rise to unforeseeable circumstances, which made
the completion of the original court-martial impossible, necessitating its continuance before a second tribunal."'
In United States v. Jorn," a 1971 Supreme Court decision which applied
the manifest necessity doctrine of Perez, the trial judge had aborted the
proceedings so that witnesses might confer with counsel before answering
government questions that might tend to incriminate them. The judge felt
that warnings given the witnesses by agents of the Internal Revenue Service
which concerned the witnesses' constitutional rights were, in all likelihood,
inadequate to protect those rights. In sustaining a plea to bar of double
jeopardy to an attempted second trial, the plurality opinion of the Court
stressed the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by a particular
tribunal"" and concluded, after reviewing the history and scope of the doctrine, that "the trial judge made no effort to exercise a sound discretion to
assure that, taking all the circumstances into account, there was a manifest
necessity for the sua sponte declaration of this mistrial." In reviewing cases
where manifest necessity prevented a double jeopardy plea in bar of a second
trial, the Court chose to cite those which emphasized the requirement of
unusual and unforeseeable circumstances necessitating the declaration of a
mistrial. 8 The Court specifically pointed out that situations which were brought
860 (1949); State v. Preto, 51 N.J. Super. 175, 144 A.2d 19 (1958); State v. Little, 120
W. Va. 213, 197 S.E. 626 (1938). See also note 12 supra.
2022 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579 (1824). "The rule announced in the Perez case has been
the basis for all later decisions of this Court on double jeopardy." Wade v. Hunter, 336
U.S. 684, 690 (1949).
21 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
at 580 (emphasis added).
22See note 17 supra.
23336 U.S. 684 (1949).
2' "Furthermore, this record is sufficient to show that the tactical situation brought about
by a rapidly advancing army was responsible for withdrawal of the charges from the first
court-martial . . . . Momentous issues hung on the invasion and we cannot assume that
these court-martial officers were not needed to perform their military functions." Id. at
691-92.
0 400 U.S. 470 (1971).
2
"ld. at 484, quoting Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684, 689 (1949).
27 Id. at 487.
20 Id. at 481-82, citing cases in which the Perez doctrine had been followed: Wade v.
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about by carelessness or other factors within the control of the prosecuting
authority did not come within the strictly circumscribed range of situations in
which a mistrial could be declared without running afoul of the double
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment."9
III.

ILLINOIS V. SOMERVILLE

In Illinois v. Somerville the Court had to decide whether the facts of the
case presented one of those sets of circumstances where a trial, once begun,
may be aborted over the defendant's objection and the defendant retried,
without the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy barring the
second trial. In deciding to allow the second trial, the majority consistently
resorted to citations from, and analogies to, cases involving situations which
conformed to the traditional requirement of unusual circumstances which
were beyond the control of the court or counsel" and had necessitated the
declaration of a mistrial. The majority seemed to ignore the fact that the defect
in this indictment could more properly be characterized as an error or oversight on the part of the prosecuting authorities. Beginning with the narrow
concept espoused in Perez,"' the Somerville Court expanded that decision by
characterizing it as a "general approach, premised on a 'public justice' policy,""1
which they found to be applicable to fact situations such as the one presented
by Somerville." Although the majority characterized the conglomerate of
traditional "manifest necessity" cases as defying "meaningful categorization," 3
it is obvious that none of the cases cited as precedent falls into any category
that could even remotely be thought of as involving what may be called
"prosecutorial error." For example, in Logan v. United States" the jury was
closeted for more than forty hours without arriving at a verdict; and in
Simmons v. United States" one of the jurors had been acquainted with the
Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949) (see text accompanying note 24 supra); Thompson v.
United States, 155 U.S. 271 (1894) (one petit juror had been member of grand jury that
handed down the indictment); Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892) (hung jury
for 40 hours); Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891) (letter published in a
newspaper rendered juror's impartiality doubtful).
29 "The trial judge must recognize that lack of preparedness by the Government to
continue the trial directly implicates policies underpining . . . the double jeopardy provision
.... ' 400 U.S. at 486.
"See notes 35 and 36 infra, and accompanying text.
"1The majority quoted the statement by Mr. Justice Story, discussed supra at note 13
and accompanying text, through which the Perez Court, in a unanimous decision, held that
the failure of a jury to reach an agreement on a verdict did not bar retrial of the defendant.
93 S. Ct. 1066 at 1069, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425 at 429. However, in the same paragraph, Mr.
Justice Story continued with a word of caution to those who would abuse this limited suspension of the constitutional protection, saying, "To be sure, the power ought to be used
with the greatest caution, under urgent circumstances .... " 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 580.
3293 S. Ct. 1066 at 1070, 35 L. Ed. 2d 425 at 431.
31 From the relatively narrow holding and constrictive language of Perez, the majority
in Somerville reached the conclusion that "[a] trial judge properly exercises his discretion
to declare a mistrial if an impartial verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of conviction
could be reached but would have to be reversed on appeal due to an obvious procedural
error in the trial." Id. Under the test enunciated by the majority, the mere fact that a reversal is sure would justify the declaration of a mistrial, and unless some type of "prosecutorial manipulation" can be shown, the defendant may be retried to serve the "ends of
public justice." Id.
4 Id.
- 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
36142 U.S. 148 (1891).
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defendant, which fact was not discovered until after the jury was sworn.
In setting forth their standard for application of the "manifest necessityends of public justice" doctrine, the majority conspicuously omitted any requirement that the situation calling for a mistrial result from circumstances
beyond the control of the parties, and promulgated what Mr. Justice Marshall, in a forceful dissent, referred to as a "general 'balancing' test."" The
majority eschewed any rigid, mechanical rule. While they recognized that
"the interest of the defendant in having his fate determined by the jury
first
impaneled is itself a weighty one,""5 they laid great emphasis on "the public's
interest in fair trials designed to end in just judgments.. ' .. As Mr. Justice
Marshall indicated,"° the deflation of the defendant's "valued right" to a mere
"weighty" consideration is indeed a a great loss in prestige for the consideration he viewed as controlling in both 1orn and Downum v. United States.41
Mr. Justice White, in a separate dissent, and Justice Marshall each took issue
with the majority analysis of Downum4 ' and felt that the new "balancing"
approach failed to afford adequate consideration to the defendant's interests."'
Under the majority approach, the trial judge, in exercising his judicial discretion, must treat each case on an ad hoc basis. The factors to be considered
include: any alternatives to declaration of a mistrial;"' the interest of the
public in seeing that criminal trials proceed to a verdict, either of acquittal
or conviction; and the interest of the defendant in having his case considered
by a jury, already impaneled, that he may feel is sympathetic to his cause.
Then, after taking all the circumstances of the case into consideration, if the
" Mr. Justice Marshall expressed his feeling that the recent cases of United States v.
Jorn, 400 U.S. 470 (1971), and Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), had
established principles to guide trial judges in determining what constituted a "manifest
necessity" for declaring a mistrial over a defendant's objection. He felt that the majority's
decision in Somerville reverted to a wholly unstructured analysis of such cases. 93 S. Ct. at
1077. 35 L. Ed. 2d at 438 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1 93 S.Ct. at 1973, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 435. Compare the majority's statement with United
States v. Jorn. 400 U.S. 470 (1971), and Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949), wherein
the Court laid great stress on the defendant's "valued right to have his trial completed by
a particular tribunal." 400 U.S. at 484.
"993 S. Ct. at 1070, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 430.
40Id. at 1077, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 439.
41372 U.S. 734 (1963) (failure of the prosecution to subpoena a key witness). Downum
is characterized by the majority as a situation lending itself to "prosecutorial manipulation."
93 S.Ct. at 1073, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 434. See note 42 infra, and accompanying text.
' In his dissent, which was joined by Justices Douglas and Brennan, Mr. Justice White
argued that no prosecutorial misconduct other than "mere oversight and mistake was claimed
or proved" and he felt that "very similar considerations" should govern the instant case.
93 S.Ct. at 1075, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 436 (White, J., dissenting). Mr. Justice Marshall flatly
accused the majority of mischaracterizing Downum since he saw the "prosecutor's negligence"
as the abortive factor. Id. at 1079, 35 L. Ed 2d at 442. He saw Downum as an exact oarallel
of the Somerville situation since he "[could] not understand how negligence lends itself
to manipulation. And even if [he) could understand that. [he could) not understand how
negligence in failing to draw an adequate indictment is different from negligence in failing
to assure the presence of a crucial witness." Id. Compare the characterization of the Downum
situation by Mr. Justice Clark in his dissent in Downum, wherein he stated, "Indeed, it
appears to be just one of those circumstances which often creep into a prosecutor's life as
a result of inadvertence .... " Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 742 (1963)
(Clark, J., dissenting).
"sSee generally 93 S.Ct. at 1075, 1077, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 437, 439.
"The Court pointed out that the trial judge in Jorn could easily have continued, rather
than aborted, the proceedings. The failure to consider alternatives was characterized as
"erratic" and thus the Court felt that no effort was made to exercise a sound discretion.
Id. at 1073, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 434.
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decision to abort the proceedings appears to be a rational determination required by "manifest necessity" and the "ends of public justice," the state may
retry the defendant without violation of the double jeopardy clause of the
fifth amendment. However, it seems that at least one of the factors the
majority considered is a constant, arising with equal weight in every case.
The public always has the same interest in seeing that criminal trials proceed
to just verdicts. Thus, it would appear that the other circumstances must tip
the scales one way or the other. Given the decreased emphasis on the defendant's right to have his case decided by the initial jury, it would seem that
the deciding factor will henceforth be the nature of the circumstances necessitating the declaration of a mistrial. It is here that the majority's failure to
consider the elements of prosecutor error or carelessness apparent in the
instant situation is most important. Under the test established in this case, it
appears that it will require the "declaration of a mistrial on the basis of a
rule or a defective procedure that lent itself to prosecutorial manipulation..."'
in order to preclude the application of the "manifest necessity" doctrine, and
thereby prevent a retrial of the defendant for the same offense.
IV. CONCLUSION

An analysis of the factors deemed controlling by the Court, considered in
conjunction with its failure to recognize other aspects of the case, makes it
clear that the importance of Somerville is found in the Court's holding that
"where the declaration of mistrial implements a reasonable state policy and
aborts a proceeding that at best would have produced a verdict that could
have been upset at will by one of the parties, the defendant's interest in
proceeding to verdict is outweighed by the competing and equally legitimate
demand for public justice."4 Yet the full import of the decision depends on
the coupling of the above holding with the Court's statement that "the
declaration of a mistrial on the basis of... a defective procedure that lent
itself to prosecutorial manipulation would involve an entirely different question .... "" In light of the majority characterization of Downum, and the
similarity of the situation in that case with the one found in Somerville,
subsequent cases will have to establish the difference between what is to be
considered prosecutorial manipulation and what mere negligence. Difficulties
in proof and the relationship between judges and prosecutors may make
many judges reluctant to find intentional manipulation. Apparently, the mere
fact that the prosecutor benefited by the delay will not sustain a finding of
manipulation, since the prosecution in Somerville gained approximately two
weeks to strengthen a somewhat weak case, and, to the extent that this time
was so used, the prosecution did profit from its negligence. Following the
rule and spirit of Somerville, future cases may have to be decided by thrashing
through all the attendant circumstances and arriving at the decision that will
best serve the dictates of that uncertain concept "the ends of public justice."
431d. at

1070, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 431.
" Id. at 1074, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 435.
47
1d. at 1070, 35 L. Ed. 2d at 431.

